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Biopolitics and Soviet Socialism: Reciprocal Blind-Spots 
 
The problematic of biopolitics has become an increasingly influential research orientation in the 
social sciences, applied in a variety of disciplines to analyse the transformations in the rationalities 
of power over life in diverse spatio-temporal contexts. The two primary contexts for these studies 
have been liberalism, particularly post-World War II neoliberalism, and fascism, particularly 
German Nazism. What has been almost entirely missing is the third major political ideology of the 
20th century, i.e. socialism, particularly in its Soviet version (for exceptions see Collier 2011; 
Hoffmann 2011). There have been numerous studies of the positive and productive orientation of 
neoliberal biopolitics that governs lives through the mobilization of the freedom of its subjects and 
the negative and destructive orientation of Nazi biopolitics that engages in paroxysmal violence in 
the name of the survival of the privileged race and ultimately threatens its very existence. Yet, the 
studies of biopolitics are all but silent about what was arguably the most ambitious project of the 
positive transformation of human lives, i.e. the creation of the ‘New Soviet Person’ as the 
emancipated subject of the socialist society, which at the same time unleashed the unprecedented 
negativity of terror against the very persons that were to be transformed. 
 
The Soviet experience provides ample historical evidence of both the positive and negative 
aspects of biopolitics, its power to ‘make live’ and to ‘let die’ (Foucault 2003, 241). Nonetheless, 
the theoretical literature on biopolitics has largely ignored the Soviet experience, while the 
empirical research in Soviet and Russian Studies has, with very few exceptions (e.g. Groys and 
Hagemeister 2005), largely ignored the problematic of biopolitics. And yet, this disconnection has 
proven highly detrimental, not merely because Stalinism offers an abundance of empirical 
examples of the exercise of power over life in a wide variety of spheres (hygiene, sexuality, 
legality, dancing, diet), but, more importantly, because this experience helps us address the 
central problem, if not the aporia, of the theory of biopolitics. This aporia consists in the relation 
between the positive and negative aspects of biopolitics. As a project of the post-revolutionary 
positive transformation of all social life along the lines of Marxist-Leninist ideology, Stalinism 
epitomizes the assumptions of positive biopolitics about the amenability of the vital processes of 
populations to transformation by political power. The infamous slogans about the constitution of 
the ‘New Soviet Person’ and the ‘Soviet people’ as a new ‘historical community of human beings’ 
clearly indicate the positive, literally constructivist character of the Soviet biopolitical project. At 
the same time, the actual experience of the construction of socialism, from the terror and the 
organized famine of the Collectivization to the anti-Semitic purge initiated by the Doctors’ Plot of 
1953, has been remarkably violent, annihilating the very lives that were to be transformed into 
something new. Stalinism thus appears to be a case of an extremely productive or positive 
biopolitics that turned into an equally extreme thanatopolitics. It is precisely this extremity, 
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whereby the paradox that arguably characterizes all biopolitics collapses into a paroxysm, that 
makes the case of Stalinism indispensable for understanding the potentiality for violence 
immanent to biopolitics as well as the limits that restrain this potentiality within various modes of 
biopolitical government.  
 
The justification for addressing the specificity of Stalinist biopolitics seems to be established 
clearly. Yet, since this justification is evident for anyone with a minimal knowledge of Soviet 
history, there remains a puzzle of why the key theorists of biopolitics either ignored the Soviet 
experience or subsumed it under Western rationalities. In this chapter we shall address the slim 
dossier of the remarks on Soviet biopolitics by the three authors most associated with this 
problematic: Foucault, Agamben and Esposito. We shall address the way socialism in these three 
accounts is either subsumed under the Western experience or removed from the account of 
biopolitics. We shall conclude by arguing that the renewed engagement with socialist biopolitics 
does not merely set the historical record straight but also permits us to understand the ontological 
foundations of biopolitics as such. 
 
The Absence of Socialist Governmentality 
 
Since Foucault never addressed Russian or Soviet politics in any detailed manner, the textual 
corpus of his writings on this case is necessarily scant, composed of brief forays in books, 
digressions in lectures, casual asides in interviews, etc. Yet, it is in no way incoherent, since, as we 
shall show, Foucault practiced the same move of the subsumption of the Soviet experience under 
Western rationalities of government in a variety of contexts during the 1970s: from aesthetics to 
labour relations, from psychiatry to concentration camps.  
     
Although Foucault’s work on biopolitics only addresses issues of Stalinism and Soviet politics 
peripherally, it was clearly influenced by the events related to them. As Jan Plamper (2002) argued 
in a definitive analysis of the theme of the Gulag in Foucault’s work, Foucault’s genealogical turn 
towards the questions of power and government in the early and mid-1970s unfolded in the 
political context dominated by the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago in French in 
1974. It was this publication that accelerated the drift of French intellectuals, including Foucault, 
away from Marxism, and contributed to the rise of the ‘anti-totalitarian’ new philosophers 
(Bernard-Henry Levy, Andre Glucksmann et al), whom Foucault briefly supported. Moreover, the 
revelations about the Gulag in Solzhenitsyn’s work led to the increased attention in France to the 
dissident movement in the USSR and Eastern Europe, which Foucault actively supported 
throughout the 1970s and whose struggle for freedom of speech arguably influenced his turn 
toward the problematic of parrhesia in the lectures of the 1980s (Foucault 2011).  
    
Nonetheless, despite its significance in the French intellectual-political context at the time, the 
Soviet case does not figure prominently in Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics. The simplest 
explanation for this absence would be Foucault’s proverbial Eurocentrism, discussed by numerous 
critics since the famous comment by Edward Said (1988, 9-10): ‘his Eurocentrism was almost total, 
as if history itself took place only among a group of French and German thinkers.’ And yet, such an 
explanation would be far too simple, since Foucault actually did discuss the Soviet Union in quite a 
number of articles, lectures and interviews of the 1970s. These texts suggest that the reason why 
Foucault did not analyse Soviet socialism as a specific case of biopolitics or governmentality was 
not his lack of interest in non-European history but rather his conviction that there was little about 
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the Soviet case that was specific, idiosyncratic or unique. For Foucault, Soviet socialism was rather 
characterized by a puzzling persistence of the governmental technologies invented in late-18th and 
19th century Europe. Whereas on the macro-level of state ideology and socioeconomic system the 
USSR obviously renounced Western capitalism, on the micro-level of disciplinary and biopolitical 
practices it continued to follow its techniques. As early as 1971, Foucault argued that the Soviet 
Union ‘adopted almost entirely the bourgeois value system. One gets the impression that 
communism in its traditional form suffers from a birth trauma: you would think that it wants to 
recapture for itself the world at the time it was born, the world of a triumphant bourgeoisie; 
communist aesthetics is realism in the style of the nineteenth century: Swan Lake, painting which 
tells a story, the social novel. Most of the bourgeois values are accepted and maintained by the 
Communist Party (in art, the family, sexuality, and daily life in general).’ (Foucault in Simon 1971, 
196) 
 
In Foucault’s view, despite the evident break with capitalist Europe in socioeconomic terms, the 
Soviet techniques of government were borrowed directly from its ideological antagonist, the only 
autochthonous addition being that of ‘party discipline’, whose genealogy has indeed been traced 
to the practices of  Orthodox Christian communities (see Kharkhordin 1999). 
[It] is undoubtedly true that the Soviets, while having modified the regime of 
ownership and the state’s role in the control of production, for the rest have simply 
transferred the techniques of administration and power implemented in capitalist 
Europe of the 19th century. The types of morality, forms of aesthetics, disciplinary 
methods, everything that was effectively working in bourgeois society already 
around 1850 has moved en bloc into the Soviet regime. Just as the Soviets have used 
Taylorism and other methods of management experimented in the West, they have 
adopted our disciplinary techniques, adding to our arsenal another arm – party 
discipline. (Foucault 1994a, 64) 
  
From this perspective, even the phenomenon of the Gulag, the paradigmatic site of Soviet 
biopolitics, appears as merely one more in the arsenal of governmental techniques borrowed by 
the Soviet regime from its ideological adversaries (see Engelstein1993). Indeed, so strong is the 
affinity that Solzhenitsyn’s metaphor of ‘archipelago’, applied to the network of Soviet labour 
camps, was transferred by Foucault (back) to the French context as a key concept in Discipline and 
Punish (Foucault 1977, 301; see also Foucault 1980, 68). Foucault famously accounted for the birth 
of the Gulag with the help of the anecdote about a French criminologist Leveille advising the 
Russian government in 1892 to confine mental patients in Siberia: ‘[Good] old Leveille had defined 
the Gulag. Deportation to Siberia already existed but I believe it must have functioned quite simply 
as exile for political prisoners. The idea that there could be set up there a politico-medical – 
politico-penal-medical, or medico-politico-penal – confinement, with an economic function, which 
would allow the exploitation of the wealth of a still virgin country, that, I think, was a new idea.’ 
(Foucault 1988a, 181-182. See Plamper 2002, 269-270 for a critique) In this manner, the Gulag is 
inserted into the European genealogy of power relations as the ‘intensification’ of the logic 
already at work in 19th century European governmentality (ibid., 181). The grand opposition 
between liberal democracy and totalitarianism is thus rendered inoperative on the level of 
governmental rationality: ‘After all, the organization of great parties, the development of political 
apparatuses, and the existence of the techniques of repression such as the camps - all that is quite 
clearly the heritage of liberal Western societies, and all Stalinism and fascism had to do was to 
stoop down and pick it up.’ (Foucault 1994b, 535). The Soviet experience is governmentally 
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identical to the West despite being ideologically distinct from it and, given Foucault’s interest in 
governmentality and a certain disdain for ideology, it is hardly surprising that the identity ended 
up more important than the difference. 
   
Biopolitics, Racism and Class Struggle 
Let us now turn to Foucault’s more extensive discussion of Soviet socialism from a biopolitical 
perspective in his 1975-1976 lecture course ‘Society Must Be Defended’. In this course Foucault 
addressed the biopolitical rationality of government in terms of the logic of racism, which 
warranted the exclusion and ultimately the extermination of the categories of the population that 
were deemed other to the race in question. The theme of racism was also central to the best-
known analysis of biopolitics in the first volume of History of Sexuality (1990), published in 1976. In 
the subsequent lectures at the College de France (1977-1978, 1978-1979) this theme all but 
disappeared, while the concept of biopolitics became rather less accentuated. In Security, Territory 
and Population (2007) Foucault abandoned the perspective of the modern shift from sovereign to 
bio-power in favour of a more extended genealogy of government from early Christianity through 
the Reformation to the 17th century doctrine of the raison d’etat and 18th century ‘police science’. 
In The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) the term reappeared in the title, but hardly anywhere else, as 
Foucault concentrated on the analysis of liberal government as the ‘basis on which something like 
biopolitics could be formed’ (ibid., 21), while repeatedly apologizing for deferring the discussion of 
biopolitics itself, which never actually came, since the concept disappeared entirely from 
Foucault’s writings after these lectures (ibid., 78, 185). ‘One would be incredibly hard-pressed to 
find in The Birth of Biopolitics anything remotely akin to a sustained analysis of biopolitics.’ 
(Hoffmann, 2014: 57) Thus, the final chapter of the first volume of the History of Sexuality and 
‘Society Must be Defended’ remain the texts where the problematic of biopolitics is treated in the 
most elaborate way. 
In History of Sexuality I Foucault uses the concept of racism to refer to Nazi regime as  the 
articulation of the sovereign ‘symbolics of blood’ and the ‘analytics of sexuality’ associated with 
the rise of bio-power (Foucault 1990, 149-150). Foucault rejects any approach to Nazism as an 
abominable exception to the Western political tradition and instead treats it as a ‘demonic’ 
synthesis of sovereign and biopolitical techniques of government already operative in Western 
societies (Foucault 1988b, 71). The biopolitical logic of racism not only permits sovereign violence 
to survive in the climate hostile to it, but fortifies this violence by investing it with a wholly new 
function, no longer negative and repressive but rather oriented toward the preservation and 
improvement of the life of some races by annihilating the lives of the others, which pose a threat 
to it.  
[Racism] is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under 
power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die. Its role is to 
allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: ‘the very fact that you let 
more die will allow you to live more’. The enemies who have to be done away with 
are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external 
or internal, to the population and for the population. In a normalizing society, race or 
racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. Once the state functions in 
the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the state. 
(Foucault 2003, 255-256) 
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Racism is what permits the state to exercise its sovereignty by enfolding it in the biopolitical 
context, in which killing is only legitimate when it serves to enhance the survival and health of 
one’s own race. Thus, the indistinction between the biopolitical preoccupation with fostering life 
and the thanato-political drive for annihilation that we observe in Nazism stops being paradoxical 
and is graspable as an expression of the logic of racism, according to which the life of any race is 
fostered by its purification from other races, which ‘implies both the systematic genocide of others 
and the risk of exposing oneself to a total sacrifice’ (Foucault 1990,149-150). 
In the final lectures of ‘Society Must Be Defended’ Foucault extends this account of racism to 
socialism, going beyond mere empirical claims about the reliance of socialist governmentality on 
the techniques developed during the rise of bio-power in 18th and 19th century Europe. Socialism is 
now also racist in the much more fundamental sense: ‘Socialism was a racism from the outset, 
even in the nineteenth century. No matter whether it was Fourier at the beginning of the century 
or the anarchists at the end of it, you will always find a racist component in socialism.’ (Foucault 
2003, 261) This is the case for two reasons. Firstly, socialism has ‘made no critique of the theme of 
biopower’ and instead has taken over ‘wholesale’ the fundamental idea of modern biopolitics 
‘that the essential function of society or the State is to take control of life, to manage it, to 
compensate for its aleatory nature, to explore and reduce biological accidents and possibilities’ 
(ibid., 261). This means that as soon as a socialist state comes to existence, it is a state ‘which must 
exercise the right to kill or the right to eliminate, or the right to disqualify’, [hence] ‘racism is fully 
operational in the way socialist states (of the Soviet Union type) deal with the mentally ill, 
criminals, political adversaries, and so on’ (ibid., 262). Secondly, socialism is racist due to its 
emphasis on class struggle and the physical confrontation with the enemy, racism being the ‘only 
way in which socialist thought, which is after all very much bound up with the themes of 
biopower, can rationalize the murder of its enemies. When it is simply a matter of eliminating an 
adversary in economic terms, or of taking away his privileges, there is no need for racism. Once it 
is a matter of coming to terms with the thought of a one-on-one encounter with the adversary, 
and with the need to fight him physically, to risk one’s own life and to try to kill him, there is a 
need for racism.’ (Ibid., 262) While in the late 19th century French context racism primarily 
characterized non-Marxist versions of socialism (Blanquism, anarchism, etc.) rather than strictly 
Marxist ones (both reformist and revolutionary), in the 20th century it pertains primarily to the 
Soviet type of socialism, including the Stalinist and post-Stalinist USSR. Thus, in Foucault’s 
argument, the only biopolitical specificity that Soviet socialism possesses consists precisely in the 
absence of any specificity, in the paradoxical and deplorable fact that for all its ideological 
heterogeneity to capitalist Europe it continued to rely on the biopolitical rationalities and 
techniques developed in it.  
 
Is There a Revolutionary Biopolitics? 
Foucault’s use of the concept of racism oscillates ambiguously between its literal sense, when 
referring to Nazism and the colonial violence of Western liberal states, and a figurative or 
metaphorical usage with regard to both the domestic politics of the liberal states and Soviet 
governmentality. In the latter case the metaphorical usage is based on the apparent similarity 
between the discourse of class struggle with its figure of ‘class enemy’ and the discourse of the 
struggle for the protection of the race with its correlate figure of the racial enemy: ‘In Soviet State 
racism, what revolutionary discourse designated as the class enemy becomes a sort of biological 
threat. So, who is the class enemy now? Well, it’s the sick, the deviant, the madman. As a result, 
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the weapon that was once used in the struggle against the class enemy is now wielded by a 
medical police, which eliminates class enemies as though they were racial enemies.’ (Foucault, 
2003: 83. Emphasis added.). Yet, is this ‘as though’ justified: was the class enemy really ‘a sort of’ 
biological threat? After all, a principled rejection of racism even in its quasi -scientific eugenic guise 
was a permanent feature of the official Soviet discourse (Hoffmann 2011, 105; Weiner 1999, 1123, 
1146-7). While there are evident limits to taking the official proclamations of the Soviet discourse 
at face value, its hostility to racism was arguably not hypocritical and arose out of the ideological 
orientation that asserted the possibility and desirability of the transformation of human nature, 
which logically made any naturalist essentialism the ‘natural’ enemy of socialism. ‘Soviet power 
demonstrated permanently and on different levels of its political and economic practice a deep, 
almost instinctive aversion toward everything natural. The campaigns against genetics and 
psychoanalysis are as characteristic in this respect as the collectivization of agriculture in the 
1930s, aimed at uprooting the peasants and severing their traditional, intimate attachment to the 
earth.’ (Groys 2011, 122. See also Dobrenko 2007, 75-82) 
The Stalinist ‘Second Revolution’ that received the apt name ‘the Great Break’ (1928-1932) was 
the attempt to overcome the traditional forms of life sedimented as quasi-natural and thereby 
endow socialism with a real existence as a positive form of life. The Great Break was a three-
pronged assault on the traditional forms of life: the forced industrialization that wiped out the 
remnants of private industry and trade and produced, literally from scratch, new industrial 
complexes and cities; the collectivization of agriculture that eliminated private farming and forced 
the rural population into state-owned collective farms; the ‘cultural revolution’ that sought to 
produce a new proletarian intelligentsia to replace ‘bourgeois specialists’ in industry, science and 
art. All three processes were marked by radical social dislocations and extreme governmental  
violence, well summed up in the claim of Stalin’s close ally Lazar Kaganovich that the Great Break 
consists in the ‘radical destruction of all socio-economic relations, accompanied by a technical 
revolution, and not the other way round.’ (Kaganovich cited in Priestland 2007, 207) 
This is why Soviet socialism was from the outset radically heterogeneous to the protective, 
securitarian or ‘immunitary’ orientation that defined Western biopolitics in its ‘racist’ inflection 
(Foucault 2007, 8-49; Esposito 2011, 112-143). Since the object of socialist biopolitics was not life 
as it was but life as it must become, Stalinism did not valorize any aspect of the existing reality (be 
it economic exchange as in liberalism or racial vitality as in Nazism) but rather cast the existing 
forms of life as ‘obsolete’ and ‘dying’ – the favoured tropes of Soviet discourse of the period (see 
Dobrenko 2007, 101-124, 313-327). It is from this perspective that the difference of class enemy 
from the racial enemy becomes clear. Even when class enemies (e.g. the representatives of the 
aristocracy, bourgeoisie or the clergy) were cast in the official discourse as unproductive 
‘parasites’, ‘vermin’ or ‘filth’ that could only corrupt the victorious proletariat and hence had to be 
excluded from the emerging polity through the deprivation of political rights, exile or 
incarceration, this exclusion did not operate in strict accordance with the naturalist and 
evolutionary logic of racism. The task of the socialist revolution was not the protection (of the 
race, nation, state, etc.) against the threat of the external or internal other but the transformation 
of society, which would abolish the existing hierarchies and distinctions between the self and the 
other. While the racist logic protects the given self against the threat of the other, the logic of class 
struggle attacks the given self in the name of the otherness that it must become. This is why the 
dominant trope of the Great Break was ‘reforging’, the transformation of human beings into ‘new 
Soviet persons’, and the Gulag camp was the prime site for such reforging, proudly publicized by 
the Soviet government in the late 1920s-early 1930s as the space where the class enemy is 
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transformed into the hero of socialist construction (see Barnes 2011).  Although the violent 
character of such reforging is evident, its very possibility was by definition denied to the racial 
enemy, which makes the metaphoric transfer of the term to the discourse of class struggle highly 
problematic.  
Yet, in addition to being historically unwarranted, Foucault’s move is also problematic from his 
own theoretical perspective that leads him to the identification of biopolitics and racism in the 
first place. Foucault’s genealogy of racism in ‘Society Must Be Defended’ left open an alternative 
possibility of conceiving socialist biopolitics as autonomous. In these lectures Foucault 
reconstitutes what he calls a ‘historico-political discourse’  of race struggle that functioned since 
the 17th century as the alternative to the more familiar discourses of political philosophy, focused 
on the problem of sovereignty. In contrast to this abstract, ahistorical and impartial discourse, 
epitomized by Hobbes, the alternative discourse, whose emergence Foucault traces in the 17th 
century England (Edward Coke, John Lillburne) and early 18th century France (Henri de 
Boullainvilliers), is historical through and through, arising within a particular struggle and taking up 
a partisan position in it (Foucault 2003, 268-271). Rather than represent society as a unity held 
together by the sovereign, this discourse cast society as always already binary, structured in terms 
of the antagonism between those in power and those lacking it, ‘[them] and us, the unjust and the 
just, the masters and those who must obey them, the rich and the poor, those who invade lands 
and those who tremble before them, the despots and the groaning people.’ (Ibid., 74) 
This antagonism was framed in terms of the struggle of two so-called ‘races’ within a society. It is 
important to note that the concept of ‘race’ in this discourse was not, in Foucault’s reading, 
pinned to any ‘stable biological meaning’ (ibid., 77) but rather designated a ‘historico-political 
divide’ between two groups in a society that did not share the same language or religion and only 
formed a united polity as a result of the conquest or subjugation of one by the other: ‘two races 
exist when there are two groups, which, although they coexist, have not become mixed because of 
the differences, dissymmetries and barriers created by privileges, customs and rights, the 
distribution of wealth, or the way in which power is exercised.’ (Ibid.) In contrast to the fictitious 
‘war of all against all’ posited by Hobbes as the precondition for the institution of sovereign 
power, the counter-historical discourse posited real instances of war, e.g. the Norman conquest, 
as the actual foundation of state power and the real conflict between the conquerors and the 
conquered as the true substance of politics and history. We are evidently a long way from the 
modern notion of racism – if anything, the function of the counter-historical discourse in its 
original formulation in the English radicalism of the 17th century is closer to what we would today 
call a ‘revolutionary’ discourse of emancipation. 
Indeed, in Foucault’s own genealogy, this counter-historical discourse served as one of the 
precursors of the explicit revolutionary discourse in 18th century France and beyond:  
What could the revolutionary project and the revolutionary idea possibly mean 
without this preliminary interpretation of the dissymmetries, the disequilibriums, the 
injustice and the violence that function despite the order of laws, beneath the order 
of laws, and through and because of the order of laws? Where would the 
revolutionary project, the revolutionary idea, or revolutionary practice be without 
the will to rekindle the real war that once went on and which is still going on? What 
would the revolutionary project and revolutionary discourse mean if the goal were 
not a certain, a final, inversion of relations of power and a decisive displacement 
within the exercise of power? (Ibid., 78-79) 
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During the 19th century the counter-historical discourse split into two tendencies, the ‘properly 
revolutionary’ discourse of class struggle that maintained the historical orientation of the earlier 
discourse but replaced its ‘races’ with socioeconomically defined classes, and the ‘properly racist’ 
discourse, which replaced the historical approach with the quasi-scientific, biological and 
evolutionary one, thus recoding the historical war as the struggle of the race for existence. While 
the discourse of class struggle maintained its predecessor’s function of undermining the stability of 
the state form, recovering and reactivating the historical war and the ‘binary society’ that gave rise 
to it, the racist, biologico-medical discourse began to serve the contrary function of the 
stabilization of social order, recasting the binary society as a monistic one, which was nonetheless 
threatened by heterogeneous elements that must be eradicated for the life of the race to be 
secure. As a result of this recasting, the state, which for the early counter-historical discourse was 
an instrument of the oppression of one race by another, becomes the ‘protector of the integrity, 
the superiority and the purity of the race. The idea of racial purity, with all its monistic, Statist and 
biological implications: that is what replaces the idea of race struggle.’ (Ibid., 81) In this manner, 
counter-history ends up reclaimed by the traditional history of sovereignty and the proto-
revolutionary discourse is converted into the anti-revolutionary discourse of state racism: 
Racism is, quite literally, revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. Whereas the 
discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against 
the historico-political discourse of Roman sovereignty, the discourse of race (in the 
singular) was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it, of using 
it to preserve the sovereignty of the State, a sovereignty whose lustre and vigour 
were no longer guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals but by medico-normalizing 
techniques. Thanks to the shift from law to norm, from races in the plural to race in 
the singular, from the emancipatory project to a concern with purity, sovereignty 
was able to invest or take over the discourse of race struggle and reutilize it for its 
own strategy. State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to protect the race. It 
becomes both an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution that 
derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations, demands and promises. 
(Ibid., 82) 
Thus, the original discourse of the struggle of the races ends up split into the revolutionary 
discourse of struggle (without races) and the ‘neo-Roman’ counter-revolutionary discourse of the 
protection of the race. This split clearly suggests the possibility of two distinct forms of biopolitics 
correlative with these two strands: the biopolitics of class struggle (socialism) and the biopolitics 
of racism (Nazism). Instead, Foucault immediately effaces this difference by subsuming the former 
under the latter as its metaphorical version. While the Nazi discourse reinserts the biological logic 
of state racism into the mythical and archaic context of the war of the races, in the Soviet 
discourse the insertion of the theme of class struggle into the biopolitical context allegedly 
produces a quasi-scientific, medico-psychiatric interpretation of racism. What was at first 
constructed as an alternative to racism, whereby history was grasped as the conflict of classes 
without a racial dimension to it, somehow becomes a form of racism, apparently all the more 
insidious because there was no actual reference to race in it.  
[Soviet racism] consists in reworking the revolutionary discourse of social struggles – 
the very discourse that derived so many of its elements from the old discourse of the 
race struggle – and articulating it with the management and the policing that ensure 
the hygiene of an orderly society. And the hoarse songs of the races that clashed in 
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battles over the lies of laws and kings, and which were after all the earliest form of 
revolutionary discourse, become the administrative prose of a State that defends 
itself in the name of social heritage that has to be kept pure. (Ibid., 83) 
The question that has not been but can be raised within the Foucauldian genealogical framework 
is whether biopower must exclusively latch onto the state racism, which is only one descendant of 
the counter-historical discourse of race struggle or whether it may also be exercised on the basis 
of the second descendant, i.e. the discourse of class struggle. After all, if racism was the ‘inversion’ 
of revolutionary discourse, what is the biopolitical content of that which it inverted? While, as we 
have seen, Foucault found the absence of an autonomous governmentality and biopolitics in 
socialism its key problem, explaining its internal contradictions and paroxysmal violence, this 
perception may well be the effect of a prior closure of biopolitics within the horizon of racism. 
Having excluded the possibility of a revolutionary biopolitics grounded in class struggle, one can 
either conclude that socialism lacks a biopolitical rationality as such or that it shares the rationality 
of racism with its ideological antagonists. Both conclusions are unhelpful for grasping the Soviet 
project and the governmental violence that accompanied it, the former effacing the specificity of 
this violence, irreducible to the traditional sovereign power of death, and the latter putting the 
blame for it on the rationality that was quite peripheral to this project.  
 
Agamben and the Inner Solidarity of Totalitarianism and Democracy 
 
 
The elision of the question of the biopolitics of socialism continues in the arguably most influential 
post-Foucauldian theory of biopolitics, Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer series. The absence of any 
engagement with socialism in Agamben’s work is much easier to understand than in Foucault’s 
case: while Foucault posited the emergence of biopolitical rationalities of government as a 
historical event marking the ‘threshold of modernity’, Agamben argues that biopolitics is, firstly, at 
least as old as sovereign power, and, secondly, coextensive with rather than opposed to it: ‘the 
inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of 
sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original 
activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as sovereign power.’ 
(Agamben 1998, 6. Emphasis original.) 
 
While Foucault was primarily interested in the positive difference of modern rationalities of 
government from sovereign modes of rule, what interests Agamben in the problematic of 
biopolitics is the overall constellation whereby life is captured in political rationalities, the 
constellation that has evidently been there long before Western liberalism, the appearance of 
statistics, the invention of the population and other categories that were relevant for Foucault’s 
historical account. In Agamben’s argument, the relation between unqualified life (zoe) and political 
life (bios) strictly parallels the relation between natural sound (phone) and articulated language 
(logos): the former functions as the negative foundation of the latter, whose exclusion, 
domination or subjugation permits the constitution of a determinate form of language or order:  
‘The living being has logos by taking away and conserving its own voice in it, even as it dwells in 
the polis by letting its own bare life be excluded, as an exception, within it.’ (Agamben 1998, 8) 
Biopolitics is then ipso facto as old as human language. The critics that accuse Agamben of 
‘dehistoricization’ are therefore ultimately incorrect: what Agamben traces is indeed a historical 
event, albeit the one that took place long before European modernity or, for that matter, the 
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Greek polis, but could be dated back to forty millennia ago (Agamben 2007, 9), i.e. the emergence 
of the human being as a speaking being.  
 
Evidently, if one adopts this perspective, then the differences between liberalism and socialism 
(or, for that matter, liberalism and Nazism) would appear to be so minor as to become almost 
invisible. And yet, Agamben’s argument does not assert the utter immutability of the biopolitical 
logic throughout the history of political orders. While biopolitics is indeed as old as human history, 
something important still happens with the advent of modernity, which is the horizon within 
which both Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism become possible. For Agamben modernity is a 
condition of nihilism, in which the devaluation of all positive forms of life (bios) leaves 
disconcealed the foundational status of zoe as the negative foundation of the political order and 
the sole possible object of political power. Given the bankruptcy of all positive forms of life, ‘the 
only task that still seems to retain some seriousness is the assumption of the burden of biological 
life, that is, of the very animality of man.’ (Agamben 2004, 76-77). In modern nihilism bios and zoe 
are no longer separated as the positive (qualified) and the negative (unqualified) senses of life but 
are rather rendered indistinct in the manifestation of the negativity at the heart of every positivity. 
 
What characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zoe in the polis, 
which is, in itself, absolutely ancient – nor simply the fact that life as such becomes 
a principal object of the projections and calculations of state power. Instead, the 
decisive fact is that the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the 
margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm 
and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter 
into a zone of irreducible indistinction. (Agamben 1998: 9) 
 
It is from this perspective that we should approach Agamben’s controversial remarks about the 
‘inner solidarity of democracy and totalitarianism’ in Homo Sacer (1998, 10). Totalitarianism does 
not exemplify the transformation or deformation of the biopolitical logic but rather its most 
extreme manifestation, whereby bare life as the object of sovereign power is no longer concealed 
under the veneer of the positive forms of good life but is revealed as such. ‘Only because politics 
in our age has been entirely transformed into biopolitics was it possible for politics to be 
constituted as totalitarian politics to a degree hitherto unknown.’ (Agamben 1998, 120) 
Totalitarianism is therefore not a relapse of modern politics into a pre-modern or archaic violence 
but rather the most thoroughgoing expression of the nihilistic tendency at the heart of modernity 
itself: ‘The totalitarianism of our century has its ground in this dynamic identity of life and politics, 
without which it remains incomprehensible. If Nazism still appears to us as an enigma, and if its 
affinity with Stalinism is still unexplained, this is because we have failed to situate the totalitarian 
phenomenon in its entirety in the horizon of biopolitics.’ (Agamben 1998, 148) 
  
Yet, what happens when totalitarianism is indeed situated in the biopolitical horizon? Agamben’s 
response to this question has been rather ambivalent, oscillating between the maintenance of the 
difference between democracy and totalitarianism as distinct modes of biopolitics and the 
cancellation of this difference in the argument for their ‘indistinction’: 
 
[The] contiguity between mass democracy and totalitarian states does not have the 
form of a sudden transformation; before impetuously coming to light in our century, 
the river of biopolitics that gave homo sacer his life runs its course in a hidden but 
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continuous fashion. One and the same affirmation of bare life leads, in bourgeois 
democracy, to a primacy of the private over the public and of individual liberties over 
collective obligations and yet becomes in totalitarian states, the decisive political 
criterion and the exemplary realm of sovereign decisions. And only because 
biological life and its needs had become the politically decisive fact is it possible to 
understand the otherwise incomprehensible rapidity with which 20th century 
parliamentary democracies were able to turn into totalitarian states and with which 
this century’s totalitarian states were able to be converted, almost without 
interruption, into parliamentary democracies. Once their fundamental referent 
becomes bare life, traditional political distinctions (such as those between Right and 
Left, liberalism and totalitarianism, private and public) lose their clarity and 
intelligibility and enter into a zone of indistinction. (Ibid., 121-122) 
  
On the one hand, democracy and totalitarianism remain distinct and it is possible to separate, and 
presumably oppose, the declarations of human rights to racist policies of exclusion or 
extermination. In this case, we might speak of the proximity of the two on the basis of their shared 
biopolitical foundation, but not really of their indistinction. The history of modernity is then 
double-sided in the strict sense that it is possible to identify two distinct sides to it, i.e. the 
progressive emancipation of bare life and its subjection to governmental rationalities. On the 
other hand, Agamben leans towards a stronger and more controversial claim that brings 
democracy and totalitarianism so close together in an ‘inner solidarity’ (cf. Agamben 1998, 10) 
that they become indistinct. In Homo Sacer this claim is presented in a brief and elliptic manner 
that calls for interpretation: 
 
Democracy, at the very moment in which it seemed to have finally triumphed over its 
adversaries and reached its greatest height, proved itself incapable of saving zoe, to 
whose happiness it had dedicated all its efforts, from unprecedented ruin. Modern 
democracy’s decadence and gradual convergence with totalitarian states in post-
democratic spectacular societies, which begins to become evident with Alexis de 
Tocqueville and finds its final sanction in the analyses of Guy Debord, may well be 
rooted in this aporia, which marks the beginning of modern democracy and forces it 
into complicity with its most implacable enemy. (Agamben 1998, 10) 
 
In this statement, the inner solidarity of democracy and totalitarianism is not so much a matter of 
their underlying identity, but rather a result of the degradation of democracy. Yet, this 
degradation is itself rooted in the originary aporia of modern democracy, which, in contrast to 
classical democracy that was founded on the exclusion of zoe from bios, ‘wants to put the freedom 
and happiness of men into play in the very place – ‘bare life’ – that marked their subjection.’ (Ibid., 
9-10) Totalitarianism appears to be the direction of democracy’s degraded development, which in 
turn is determined by its constitutive flaw, at least in its modern version.  
 
While the examples of the collapse of democracies into totalitarianism in the 20 th century are all 
too familiar, Agamben’s scandalous invocation of ‘inner solidarity’ between the two regimes is not 
merely grounded in the familiar historical evidence of the fragility of democratic institutions (i.e. it 
is not a ‘historiographical claim’) (1998, 10) but arises from Agamben’s interpretation of both 
regimes as instances of modern nihilism. What ultimately accounts for the intimate solidarity of 
the two regimes is the condition of nihilism that renders both of them devoid of sense and 
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accounts for their ‘decadence’. The key inspiration here is Guy Debord’s famous theory of the 
‘society of the spectacle’ (1994), which has been influential for the development of Agamben’s 
thought since the late 1970s. For Debord, both totalitarian and democratic regimes were forms of 
what he called the spectacle, in which authentic existence is replaced by representation and the 
commodity-form colonizes social life as such. Socialist totalitarianism exemplified a ‘concentrated’ 
spectacle, in which the sphere of representation was controlled by the state apparatus, while 
liberal democracy exemplified a ‘diffuse’ spectacle, in which this control was disseminated 
throughout civil society. In his later Comments on the Society of the Spectacle Debord (2011) 
introduced the third figure of the ‘integrated spectacle’, a post-Cold War synthesis of democratic 
and totalitarian forms that combines enhanced state control with the proliferation of ‘private’ 
production of representations (see Agamben 2000, 73-89).  
 
This theory is important for understanding Agamben’s pessimism about democracy at the very 
moment of its apparent triumph at the end of the Cold War. What some commentators viewed as 
the ‘end of history’, whereby democracy became the ‘only game in town’, having triumphed over 
its adversaries, was for Agamben the premonition of democracy’s own decay.  
 
The substantial unification of the concentrated spectacle (the Eastern people’s 
democracies) and of the diffused spectacle (the Western democracies) into an integrated 
spectacle is, by now, trivial evidence. The immovable walls and the iron curtains that 
divided the two worlds were wiped out in a few days. The Eastern governments allowed 
the Leninist party to fall so that the integrated spectacle could be completely realized in 
their countries. In the same way, the West had already renounced a while ago the balance 
of powers as well as real freedom of thought and communication in the name of the 
electoral machine of majority vote and of media control over public opinion, both of which 
had developed within the totalitarian modern states. (Agamben 2000, 81) 
 
If the political history of modernity is approached in terms of the convergence of liberal 
democracy and totalitarianism in the form of the integrated spectacle of the globa l police state, 
then the phenomenon of Soviet socialism may be retroactively devalued as ultimately little more 
than a step in this abysmal process. Writing in the early 1990s, when the communist ideal and 
practice were utterly discredited, Agamben understandably found little of interest in it other than 
as a transitional stage towards the synthetic version of the spectacle that makes the formerly 
‘hidden’ solidarity between totalitarianism and democracy entirely manifest. As a form of 
totalitarianism, Stalinism both shares with democracy its biopolitical grounding and gradually 
converges with it as a result of its own and democracy’s degeneration under the condition of 
nihilism. 
 
From this perspective, Agamben’s subsumption of Stalinism under totalitarianis m, which is in turn 
subsumed under the Western ontopolitical tradition is understandable. And yet, there arises a 
question of whether the Stalinist case might not have offered Agamben a better paradigm of what 
he intended to demonstrate with the example of the Nazi camp as the paradigmatic nomos of 
modernity (1998, 166-180). In fact, the Stalinist camps of the late 1920-early 1930s function much 
better as the paradigms of the state of exception becoming the rule, precisely insofar as there was 
little that was actually exceptional in their operation. While the concentration camps established 
by the Spanish in Cuba or the British in South Africa as well as the Nazi death camps were clearly 
exceptional (in relation to a well-defined norm in liberal regimes or eventually eclipsing the norm 
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itself in the Nazi case), the Soviet camp of the period of the Great Break was, in a strict sense, the 
paradigm of the norm itself rather than an exception in any sense of the word (Arendt 1973, 287-
288, 434-459; Losurdo 2011, 114-115). This is why the Gulag was never concealed by the regime 
until the Great Purges of 1937-1939 but, on the contrary, was publicized incessantly as the site of 
the ‘reforging’ of human beings into ‘new Soviet persons’, which was indeed the essence of the 
socialist project.  
   
If the Nazi camps were genuinely different from the rest of society and ending up in one of them 
certainly entailed a drastic change in one’s way of life, then the Soviet society under early 
Stalinism must be grasped as simply a zero-degree camp, in which the very same process of 
reforging unfolded with a lesser intensity, milder violence or looser control. For this reason, 
Stalinism best illustrates the tendency towards the integrated spectacle that Agamben laments, 
which does not consist in the mere proliferation of exceptional spaces, in which one is exposed to 
governmental violence, but rather in the disappearance of the very differences between the 
exceptional and the normal, when there is no longer any possibility of ‘perpetual flight’ or ‘foreign  
land’ to escape to, when escape is meaningless since one only flees into another version of the 
camp (see Agamben 1998, 183). Agamben’s gloomy premonition of the destiny of global 
biopolitics is more understandable in terms of the universalization of the Gulag rather than of 
Auschwitz. 
  
 
Esposito on Totalitarianism and Biopolitics 
  
Roberto Esposito’s theory of biopolitics, developed in his Communitas – Immunitas – Bios trilogy 
(2008a, 2010, 2011) and other works, follows Agamben in interpreting biopolitics in ontological 
terms, tracing its thanatopolitical turn to the immunitary logic of the protection of life by negative 
means. While Esposito’s main works barely mention the socialist case and instead focus on Nazism 
as the extreme point of the immunitary-biopolitical tendencies of the Western tradition, in his 
article ‘Totalitarianism or Biopolitics?’ (2008b) Esposito addresses socialism at length in his 
comparison of totalitarianism and biopolitics as two hermeneutic paradigms for understanding 
20th century politics. He reads theories of totalitarianism, from Arendt to Talmon and Furet, as 
problematic attempts to identify the origins of the catastrophes of the 20th century. Arendt (1973) 
finds these origins in the decline of the Greek polis and the ensuing depoliticization throughout 
the history of Western civilization, which took a particularly intense and lethal form with the late 
19th century crisis of the nation-state, the emergence of imperialism and the appearance of racism 
as a political force. In contrast, Talmon (1970) finds the origins of totalitarianism in the egalitarian 
excesses of democracy that give rise to formerly unseen forms of despotism (Esposito 2008b, 636-
638). According to Esposito, both of these theories fail to provide a coherent account of a single 
origin (or set thereof) of the two distinct phenomena of Nazism and Stalinism that they subsume 
under the notion of totalitarianism.  
 
Arendt’s analysis traces the genealogy of Nazism in 19th century European anti-Semitism, early 20th 
century imperialism and colonial administration and the post-World War I decline of the nation-
state. Yet, while it is certainly plausible in the case of Nazism and other European fascisms, this 
account is difficult to apply to the Soviet case, since anti-Semitism and imperialism did not play the 
same role in revolutionary and post-revolutionary Russia as they did in Central Europe. Moreover, 
Esposito plausibly wonders ‘how [we] are to hold together in a single categorical horizon a 
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hypernaturalistic conception such as that of Nazism with the historicist paroxysm of communism. 
From a philosophical point of view, what does a theory of absolute equality—which is what 
communism at least in its principles purports to be—have to do with a theory and indeed a 
practice of absolute difference such as found in Nazism?’ (ibid., 637)? While in the famous 
concluding chapter of Origins of Totalitarianism, entitled ‘Ideology and Terror’, Arendt does 
indeed attempt to hold the two together by subsuming racist naturalism and class historicism 
under her notion of the totalitarian ideology, the discussion of the origins of totalitarianism in the 
preceding parts of the book only seems to explain recourse to Nazi hypernaturalism and not 
Bolshevik historicism. Thus, Arendt’s account of the origins of totalitarianism works much better as 
the genealogy of Nazism alone and, as Domenico Losurdo argued, the elements of this genealogy 
(e.g. racism, eugenics, imperialism, concentration camps, etc.) have a lot more in common with 
British and American liberalism than with Soviet Russia (Losurdo 2004, 38-41).  
  
On the other hand, the theories that find the origins of totalitarianism in the alleged egalitarian 
excess of democracy that leads it to self-destruction have trouble subsuming under this scheme 
the experience of Nazism, which was hardly ever marked by the affirmation of egalitarianism. ‘The 
totalitarian regime doesn’t arise out of a defect but rather from an excess, a surplus, of 
democracy, from a democracy so radical, so extreme and absolute, and so full of egalitarianism as 
to break down its own formal limits and so to collapse on itself, turning into its opposite.’ (Esposito 
2008b, 638) Yet, if it is the egalitarian legacy of the French Revolution that somehow generates 
totalitarianism as an immanent perversion of democracy, then Nazism would clearly not belong to 
this genealogy and hence should not be counted as ‘totalitarian’. Moreover, by posi ting 
totalitarianism as somehow immanent to democracy as its dream (equality) turning into its 
nightmare (the camp) (Esposito 2008b, 638), these authors unwittingly undermine the very 
opposition between democracy and totalitarianism that permitted grouping  together Nazism and 
communism in the first place. If ‘communism is both democracy’s dream and its nightmare’ (ibid.), 
then its relation to it is much more complex than a frontal antagonism that characterizes the 
relation of Nazism to democracy.  
  
Dismissing both versions of the theory of totalitarianism as incoherent, Esposito then turns to 
biopolitics. Whereas the former approach remained tied to a unified interpretation of the history 
of modernity (i.e. as the grand conflict between democracy and totalitarianism), the theory of 
biopolitics traces a radical disruption within history that takes place when life as such ‘bursts into 
politics, thereby breaking apart its presumed autonomy, shifting discourse onto a terrain that is 
irreducible to traditional terms like democracy, power and ideology’ (ibid., 639). This disruption 
permits Esposito to rigorously distinguish Nazism from communism: ‘[Nazism] isn’t an ideology 
because it belongs to a dimension that is different from and subordinate to that of ideas, f rom 
which Marxist communism was born. Nazism isn’t a markedly different species within the same 
genus, because it is situated outside Western tradition (a tradition that also includes the 
philosophy of communism among its offspring). Nazism isn’t a political philosophy but a political 
biology, a politics of life and politics over life transformed into its opposite and for that very reason 
productive of death.’ (Ibid., 640) While the antagonism between e.g. liberalism and socialism 
pertains to and unfolds in the realm of ideas that mediate the access of power to life as such, 
Nazism is ‘immediately biological’ and it is this singularity of Nazism that renders the category of 
totalitarianism inoperative (ibid., 641). The difference between Nazism and communism is not 
merely a difference between two ideologies but a difference between an ideology and a biology, 
i.e. between things so incommensurable that they cannot be subsumed under a single concept. 
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Moreover, the attention to the biopolitical character of liberalism entails that the category of 
‘liberal democracy’, conventionally used as the antithesis of totalitarianism, also becomes 
inoperative, insofar as the universalist and egalitarian connotations of democracy clearly conflict 
with the particularistic and naturalistic logic of liberal biopolitics.  
 
[When] the living or dying body becomes the symbolic and material epicentre of the 
dynamics of politics as well as its conflicts, we move into a dimension that lies not simply 
after or beyond democracy but resolutely outside it. Democracy is always directed to a 
totality of equal subjects, given the fact that they are separated from their own bodies and 
therefore understood as pure logical atoms endowed with rational will. This is why the 
onset of life into dispositifs of power marks the eclipse of democracy. (Ibid., 643-644)  
 
Thus, Esposito supplants the very opposition between democracy and totalitarianism by the 
dualism of democracy (which now includes communism as the ‘paroxysmal fulfilment’ (ibid., 642) 
of the egalitarian promise) and biopolitics, which in turn is split between its statist form in Nazism 
and the individualist form in liberalism. The most fundamental political question of our time is 
then not the struggle between liberal democracy and left or right totalitarianism but between the 
egalitarian aspirations of democracy that constructs its subjects as ‘disembodied subjectivities’ 
and the biopolitical rationality of government that restores the ‘bodily dimension’ as at once 
‘subject and object’ of politics (ibid., 643). 
  
Yet, even if we grant that the antagonism between biopolitics and democracy is indeed the 
definitive conflict of late modernity, where does socialism fit in this dualism? Surely, it cannot be 
placed on the side of democracy, particularly in Esposito’s own definition of it, given the 
abundance of historical evidence of downgrading of ‘disembodied subjectivity’, be it legal or 
moral, in Soviet politics and the exercise of power directly and immediately on the ‘bodily 
dimension’, be it in military parades, shock labour campaigns, the Gulag camps or the NKVD 
torture chambers. Yet, it is also impossible to place it on the side of biopolitics,  as Esposito defines 
it, since it is heterogeneous both to the individualist biopolitics of liberalism (due to its 
suppression of individualism) and the statist biopolitics of Nazism (due to its heterogeneity to the 
latter’s racism and biologism). While in the dualism of democracy and totalitarianism Soviet 
socialism was illegitimately lumped together with Nazism, in the new dualism of democracy and 
biopolitics we at best end up repeating this gesture, whereby socialism becomes a metaphorical 
version of Nazi racism, and at worst lose sight of Stalinism altogether, since it becomes 
unsubsumable under either of the two categories. Just as the Cold War opposition of democracy 
and totalitarianism lacked logical coherence by permanently producing a remainder that could not 
be incorporated into it, the new dualism of democracy and biopolitics leaves a remainder of its 
own, a regime that is apparently neither democratic nor biopolitical. 
   
Conclusion 
 
Thus, contemporary theories of biopolitics follow Foucault’s inaugural move of the elision of the 
question of socialist biopolitics. Socialism is always already subsumed, either together with Nazism 
as the totalitarian version of racist biopolitical rationality, or together with Western biopolitics as 
such as the hyperbolic paradigm of its degradation, or simply disappears as somehow not properly 
biopolitical at all. And yet, this subsumption is highly problematic. The experience of Soviet 
16 
 
socialism was strongly heterogeneous to the naturalist governmentalities that characterized, in 
different ways, both liberalism and Nazism. In contrast to the immunitary orientation of these 
governmentalities, which sought to protect life from itself and thereby exposed it to death, 
socialism focused on life as an object of transformation rather than protection. Its recourse to 
extreme violence is therefore inexplicable in terms of the excess of protection but rather arises 
from the withdrawal of all protection in the first place, the exposure of the forms of life already 
deemed obsolete and dying in the name of the new, true, better forms of life to be constructed 
(Prozorov 2013).  
While the paroxysms of Western biopolitics teach us an important lesson about the perils of 
politicized naturalism, the socialist case leads to the problematization of political constructivism, 
the disposition that approaches forms of life as constructible effects of wilful actions. In his Opus 
Dei, Agamben traces the genealogy of this disposition to the Christian liturgy, from which it 
became generalized as the ontology of effectiveness: ‘Being and acting today have for us no 
representation other than effectiveness. Only what is effective and as such governable and 
efficacious, is real: this is the extent to which office, under the guise of the humble functionary or 
the glorious priest, has changed from top to bottom the rules of first philosophy as much as those 
of ethics.’ (2013, xiii) In the biopolitical context, this ontology leads to the understanding of politics 
as what must be lived, actualized in positive forms of life constructed in governmental projects. In 
its quest to translate communist ideology into lived reality Soviet socialism was a particularly 
extreme version of this logic, yet it remains operative in the regimes whose governmental 
rationality is furthest away from socialism, e.g. the neoliberal restructuring of various social 
domains in accordance with economic rationality. This is why socialism cannot be subsumed under 
the naturalist orientations of Western biopolitics but rather remains the prime site for a critical 
engagement with biopolitical constructivism. 
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